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ST~TEMENT OF THE N~TURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Bruce E. Holmes ("Holmes"), 
commenced action against the respondent, DeGraff ~ssociates, 
Inc. ("DeGraff"), for payment of a real estate commission, 
allegedly owing in connection with DeGraff's sale of real 
property. The respondent asserted various counterclaims, 
none of which are before this Court on appeal. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court, the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, 
Jr., hearing this case without a jury, after trial of the 
issues, awarded judgment on the complaint to respondent and 
awarded judgment to appellant on the counterclaims. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent respectfully requests that the judgment 
of the Third District Court be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent does not fully agree that the statement 
of facts set forth by the appellant is accurate to acquaint 
the court with the background facts necessary to make a 
decision in this case. Since this dispute primarily 
involves issues of fact, we deem it necessary, therefore, to 
state the facts in full as presented to the trial court. 
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DeGraff and Holmes are both members of the Salt 
Lake Board of Realtors (the "Board of Realtors") (Tr. 3), 
In the first week of May 1977, DeGraff caused to be placed 
in the multiple listing catalogue of the Board of Realtors, 
a listing for the sale of real property in Salt Lake County, 
Utah (Tr. 16, Exhibit 7-P), which DeGraff, in turn, was 
purchasing on contract (Exhibit 36-P). On May 13, 1977,' 
DeGraff filed with the Board of Realtors a "non-sale 
agreement" for the removal of that property from sale across 
the multiple listing service (Exhibit 9-P). 
Having seen the listing, and after initial 
telephone contacts with DeGraff subsequent to filing of the 
non-sale agreement (Tr. 65-66), Holmes met with Clara 
DeGraff, corporate secretary of the respondent, on June 17, 
1977, for purposes of negotiating Holmes' 
property (Tr. 67, Exhibit 24-D). Holmes 
purchase of that 
brought to that 
meeting a printed, standard form of an option (Tr. 68, 102), 
upon which Holmes typed the proposed terms of the option ana 
the proposed terms of sale upon exercise of the option (Tr. 
102). In doing so, Holmes left various blanks to be filled 
in after further negotiation, including a blank in the 
standard language of the form providing for payment of a 
commission (Tr. 71, 72, 103, Exhibit 24-D). Because Holmes 
was obtaining the option for his own account and not as an 
agent for a third party, DeGraff insisted that no commission 
-2-
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was to be paid in connection with this transaction (Tr. 
105). Holmes, in apparent agreement, in Holmes' own 
handwriting, filled in the blanks, including the provision 
that no commission would be payable (Tr. 71, 72); and Holmes 
was aware, at that time, that the option would not have been 
executed by DeGraff if the option would have provided for 
payment of a con~ission (Tr. 105, 109). 
While evidence showed that a real estate commission 
normally is payable to a person who is acting as agent on 
behalf of a third-party seller or buyer (Tr. 5, 29, 30), the 
evidence showed that these particular transactions at issue 
before the trial court involved, instead, transactions 
negotiated between two parties-in-interest. The record 
clearly shows that (1) Holmes executed the option in his own 
name as buyer, not as a representative or agent on behalf of 
any third parties (Exhibits 24-D, 25-D, 27-D, 32-D; Tr. 72, 
9'2, 109, 110, 118, 128); (2) Holmes was aware and willing 
that he personally obtain the benefits of, and assume the 
obligations under, the option as buyer ( Tr. 109); ( 3) Holmes 
paid the consideration for the option by a personal check 
drawn on Holmes' bank account (Tr. 74); (4) Holmes recorded 
a notice of interest in the office of the Salt Lake County 
Recorder giving public notice of his personal claimed 
interest in the property (Exhibit 28-D); (5) Holmes treated 
his interest in the option as a personal interest in that he 
-3-
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formally executed documentation assigning his personal: 
interest in the option {Exhibits 26-D, 34-D); {6) Holmes 
personally exercised the option {Exhibits 25-o, 27-D); and 
{7) Holmes submitted a request for arbitration 
Board of Realtors supplying the information 
personally, was the buyer {Exhibit 32-0). 
with the : 
that he, 
The record further is clear, from the testimony of' 
Holmes himself and from the testimony of Benjamin Scott, 
executive vice president of the Board of Realtors, that, 
notwithstanding the nature of the transaction, a broker has 
the continuing right to negotiate the amount or percentage 
of any commission which may be payable to him, regardless 
the contents of any documents otherwise previously filed 
with the Board of Realtors, including a right to negotiate 
for no commission at all {Tr. 12, 115). The trial court did 
find that Holmes did negotiate an agreement providing for no 
commission to be paid {R. 85). 
The evidence further showed that Holmes considered 
the option fully enforceable against DeGraff and never 
raised any question as to its enforceability prior to the 
completion of the sale (R. 85; Exhibits 25-D, 27-D, 31-D; 
Tr. 106, 113, 149-150). Likewise, DeGraff, at all times, 
considered the option enforceable and treated the final 
closing of the sale as the culmination of the transactions 
contemplated in the option as negotiated (Tr. 93, 95, 131, 
-4-
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132, 138). The evidence, including the option agreement 
itself, showed that the parties had assumed the drafting of 
subsequent documentation, such as escrow instructions to 
complete the carrying out and closing of the option (Tr. 
138, Exhibit 24-D). 
Subsequent to execution of the option, and prior to 
closing, issues arose between Holmes and DeGraff as to the 
enforceability of the option, as prepared by Holmes (Tr. 
138-139). Notwithstanding these disputes and discussions, 
DeGraff went through with the sale of the property, and the 
closing took place providing for the same purchase price as 
originally agreed in the option (Exhibits 17-P, 24-D). 
Negotiation of all terms of the sale with DeGraff were 
conducted by Holmes himself (Tr. 34, 43-44), and Holmes 
supplied to the title company the information to be included 
in the closing documents (Tr. 114). 
Subsequent to execution of the option, Holmes 
entered into arrangements with American Development Company, 
whereby American Development Company ultimately became 
purchaser of the subject property (Exhibit 17-P). The 
evidence disclosed, however, that DeGraff, at no time prior 
to closing of sale, was made aware of any buyer being 
involved other than Holmes himself; and, in fact, upon 
closing DeGraff still assumed that American Development 
company, the ultimate buyer, was still Holmes doing business 
-5-
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in another name (Tr. 57, 87, 114, 131, 134, 135, 136, 137), 
Glen Saxton, President of 4merican Development Company, 
testified that, even as of the time of trial, he had never 1 
met the president of DeGraff Associates, Inc., who signed 
the final closing documents ( Tr. 36). Indeed, evidence 
shows that Holmes purposely withheld from DeGraff the 
knowledge of a third party buyer being involved (Exhibit 
33-D), although Holmes kept American Development Company 
fully advised of the progress of the sale, negotiations of 
disputes, and other events leading to final closing of the 
sale under the option (Tr. 110). With the exception of the 
Option Agreement, Holmes and DeGraff never entered into a~· 
other agreement with respect to a commission or otherwise 
(R.86). Finally, Holmes obtained an agreement from 4merican 
Development Company whereby 4merican Development Company 
agreed to pay a commission to Holmes if Holmes was not 
successful in obtaining a commission from DeGraff through 
arbitration (Exhibit 35-0). 
The evidence showed, further that Holmes privately 
assumed that the rules and regulations of the multiple 
listing service would mandate payment of a commission 
regardless of his clear and unambiguous written agreement to 
the contrary (Tr. 105, 106; Exhibit 30-0). 
The trial court, having heard and examined the 
evidence, and being aware of the disputed facts and issue: 
-'i-
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of law, 
valid 
found that Holmes and DeGraff had entered into a 
agreement whereby Holmes agreed that he was not 
entitled to a commission from this sale and that Holmes' 
agreement continued in effect at all times (R. 85-86). 
Holmes, at no time, has filed any challenge or objection to 
the substance or wording of the court's Findings of Fact. 
The trial court, therefore, gave deference to the provisions 
of Holmes' agreement and concluded that, as agreed, no 
commission was payable. Holmes has petitioned this Court to 
adopt a contrary view which requires the overruling of the 
trial court's Findings of Fact. 
ARGUMENT I 
HOLMES, BY HIS OWN AGREEMENT, 
IS NOT ENT1TLED TO A COMMISSION 
Holmes' recitation of facts in his brief 
essentially set forth facts as Holmes would like to have 
them interpreted by this Court. However, this Court should 
review the facts and circumstances in this case as found by 
the trial court and not necessarily as urged by Holmes. 
corporation Nine v. Taylor, 30 Utah 2d 47, 513 P.2d 417 
(1973); Kier v. Condrack, 25 Utah 2d 139, 478 P.2d 327 
( 1970) . 
This lawsuit, in effect, constitutes Holmes' 
attempt by judicial fiat to circumvent the terms of Holmes' 
-7-
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written agreement that no commission would be payable, i 
Holmes has not disputed the clear and unambiguous language 
of the option agreement itself, as far as it pertains to the 
matter of a commission. Rather, Holmes seeks to negate his' 
agreement by attempting to convince this Court that, as a 
matter of law, either the agreement concerning a commission 
is not in force or else the agreement is superceded by the 
rules of the multiple listing service and documents on file 
with the 13oard of Realtors which were executed prior to 
execution of the option agreement. 
The multiple listing services rules and agreements, 
of course, generally conte,nplate pay:nent of commissions 
among the real estate brokers and agents representing buyers 
and sellers of real property because the commission; 
typically are the sole source of payment to the broker or 
agents; and, normally, these rules and agreements are 
inapplicable with regards to a broker buying on his own 
account where he would get his profit through normal mean: 
of inves~'llent, not by commission. 
The respondent does not acknowledge th€ 
applicability in this case of documentation on file with ths 
Board of Real tors. But assuming, ad arguendo, that HoLne: 
would have been entitled to a commission in the absence o: 
his written agreement to the contrary, Holmes clearly ha: 
the continuing right to contract for a different amount of' 
-3-
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commission or, indeed, for no commission at all. Smith v. v 
Burton, 4 Utah 2d 61, 63, 286 P.2d 806, 807 (1955). 
In the testimony at trial, both Holmes himself and 
Benjamin Scott, executive vice-president of the Board of 
Realtors, acknowledged the continuing right to negotiate a 
commission. Since this right exists for a broker acting as 
agent for a third party, ~ fortiori, Holmes, as a principal 
in the matter at issue, had no less of a right. The trial 
court found that, in fact, Holmes did enter into a valid and 
enforceable agreement binding on Holmes. This right of 
negotiation of a commission was again exercised by Holmes, 
prior to closing of the sale, wherein he obtained an 
agreement for receipt of a commission from American 
Development Company in the event Holmes does not recover a 
commission from DeGraff (Exhibit 35-D). 
Further impliedly acknowledging the certainty of 
the option language, Holmes, relying as a matter of law on 
the doctrines of integration and 
attempts to convince this Court 
merger of contracts, 
that this language is 
superfluous because the specific agreement providing for no 
commission was somehow superseded by subsequent 
documentation. The overriding problem with this argument, 
however, is that the trial court considered this argument 
and, after hearing evidence, specifically found that, as the 
parties intended, the agreement providing for no commission 
-9-
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continued throughout the entire transaction for the sale off 
the subject property. A.n irony in Holmes' purported 
reliance upon the doctrines of merger and integration is' 
Holmes' continued argument that rules of the multiple 
f 
listing service are applicable. If any merger and, 
integration occurred in this case, it occurred through the 1 
merger and integration of the multiple listing service 
agreements into the subsequent option agreement wherein 
Holmes cemented his negotiated commission terms. 
Whether an integration or merger of contracts has: 
occurred is not an arbitrary universal matter of law, but is 
a factual determination to be made after examination of the' 
totality of the circumtances. Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. 
Lentz, 28 Utah 2d 261, 267, 501 P. 2d 266, 270 ( 1972). In' 
that same case the Court also said: 
The trial court did not err in following the 
rule of law that where two or more instruments 
are executed by the same parties 
contemporaneously, or at different times in 
the course of the same transaction, and 
concern the same subject matter, they will be 
read and construed together so far as 
determining the respective rights and 
interests of the parties, although they do not 
in terms refer to each other. 501 P. 2d at 
271. See also, Shattuck v. Chase, 86 C. l\..2d 
810, 195 P.2d 475, 477 (1948) 
.1\.mple evidence was presented to the trial court 
that the parties, by executing the option agreement, 
contemplated the necessity of further documentation to 
-10-
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complete the terms of the option agreement. A notable 
example is Holmes' language in his letter exercising the 
option that he would "arrange for 
through the title company (Exhibit 
the escrow closing" 
25-D), although the 
option agreement contains no language which contemplates any 
escrow arrangement. 
Significantly, the final documents of sale and 
closing make no mention of a commission, with the exception 
of the self-serving language arbitrarily supplied by Holmes 
and inserted on the closing statement to the effect that the 
amount of a commission was "in arbitration." 
Common transactions analagous to the issue before 
this Court exist in the State of Utah whereby a standard 
form Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase is used in 
contemplation of the subsequent execution of a final 
standard-form Uniform Real Estate Contract which "shall 
abrogate this Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase." 
While the Earnest Money ll.greement contains a sentence 
providing for payment of a commission, the Uniform Real 
Estate Contract makes no mention of a commission. One can 
fairly inquire as to whether Holmes, who earns much of his 
1 iv ing by commissions, would contend that the subsequent 
contract, by integration or merger, eliminates the Earnest 
Money ll.greement terms regarding commission. 
-ll-
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Finally, it should be emphasized that DeGraff did 
not prepare any of the documents involved in the sale. 1\ll 
of the documents either were prepared by Holmes himself or 
as a result of information supplied by Holmes. To the 
extent the issues and disputes exist between the parties as 
a result of ambiguities or uncertainties in the documents 
themselves, these documents should be construed most 
strongly against Holmes himself. Smith v. 13 ur ton, 4 Utah 2d 
61, 63, 286 P.2d 806, 807 (1955). 
ARGUMENT II 
HOLMES CANNOT NEGATE THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT, 
WHICH HE DRAFTED, BY ALLEGING THEIR UNENFORCEA13ILITY 
In his attempt to circumvent the specific 
contractural provision which should be dispositive of the 
issues, Holmes argues that the option agreement is 
unenforceable as a matter of law because the language of the 
option agreement, which Holmes prepared, provides for terms 
of payment which purportedly violate the rule against 
perpetuities. The respondent understands the reasons that 
Holmes in his brief makes little mention of the fact that 
Holmes himself negotiated the option, drafted the allegedly 
unenforceable language, and filled in the handwritten 
language in issue. The respondent, further, finds no reaso~ 
to dispute Holmes' inartful drafting of the option 
-l2-
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agreement. The respondent, however, cannot accept the 
unreasonable leap of logic that assumes that Holmes' 
language automatically created an unenforceable document. 
Holmes certainly has the least standing to raise this 
argument because DeGraff would have been the party to raise 
this issue as an excuse for non-performance. Moreover, even 
assuming that DeGraff could have refused to perform under an 
unenforceable contract does not mean that the contract is, 
in fact and for all purposes, nullified. Holmes' 
implication is that the rule against perpetuities is a 
self-operating rule 
contract even in the 
which automatically nullifies 
absense of the appropriate 
the 
party$ 
raising of the issue as a defense. Every case which Holmes 
cites in his brief as authority for the nullification of 
this contract merely discusses the principles of law in the 
context of non-performance by a party, unlike the 
circumstances of this case as found by the trial court. 
Holmes' argument ignores the fact that no 
determination has been made by the trial court, or by any 
other authoritative tribunal, that the language of the 
option created an unenforceable document. Although DeGraff 
did raise questions as to the enforceability of the option 
agreement, DeGraff nevertheless did carry through with the 
sale of the properties and chose not to refuse to perform on 
the basis of unenforceability, which was peculiarly 
-13-
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DeGraff's to raise. Since the trial court expressly found 
that the transactions contemplated by the option agreement 
were carried to fruition, the issue is moot as to whether 
any language of the agreement might have been uneforceable. 
Holmes' approach is both novel and interesting in the way 
Holmes attempts to raise a specter of unenforceability, not 
to compel performance, but to defeat the prior performance 
of the agreement by the parties. 
One may reasonably inquire as to whether Holmes 
intended to draft an unenforceable document. The pol icy of 
the law is to recognize that a person who enters into a 
contract does so in good faith to carry out the intent of 
the parties. Weber Meadow-View Corp. v. Wilde, 575 P.2d 
1053 (Utah 1978). In addition, the presumption under the 
law is that parties, in entering into agreements, intend to 
prepare enforceable arrangements. Anderson v. Great Eastern 
Casualty Co., 51 Utah 78, 1'58 P. 966 (1917) 17 Am.Jur., 
"Contracts" Section 254 at pp. 647-48; Section 244 at P. 
631. Who is to say at this time whether a trial court, if 
properly confronted with this specific issue, would have 
enforced or invalidated the agreement? Indeed, this Court 
has said: 
We recognize the validity of the rule 
relied upon by the defendants that to be 
enforceable a contract must be sufficiently 
definite in its ter;ns that the parties know 
what is required of them. Sut like all rules, 
-14-
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~hich are necessarily stated in generality, it 
1~ only applicable in the proper 
c1rcumstances, where the justice of the case 
req~i~es: . as a shield to protect a party from 
an lnJ ust1ce, and not as a weapon with which 
to perpetrate an injustice. Under the 
evidence and the particular facts of this 
case, we are not convinced tht we should 
disagree with the view of this matter which it 
is apparent was taken by the trial court: when 
the parties had reached agreement and 
committed themselves on the major aspects of 
the transaction. (Citations omitted). Kier v. 
Condrack, 25 Utah 2d. 139, 478 P.2d 327, 330 
(l970). See also, Pitcher v. Lauritzen, 18 
Utah 2d 368, 423 P.2d 491 ( 1967). 
To adopt the logic of Holmes' rationale would be to 
accept the proposition that a person can draft a contract 
poorly and then refuse to perfor~ his responsibilities 
because the other party might have challenged the contract's 
enforceability. 
ARGUMENT III 
NO REPUDIATION OCCURRED ELIMINATING THE AGREEMENT 
CONCERNING PAYMENT OF NO COMMISSION 
Through a self-serving and highly selective summary 
of the alleged "facts" in this case, not in accordance with 
the trial court's findings, Holmes claims that DeGraff 
repudiated the ter~s of the option agreement. Under Holmes' 
argument, the terms of the option agreement, therefore, 
somehow became inapplicable, resulting in a requirement for 
payment of a commission because of doc umen tat ion of the 
-15-
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multiple listing service. By arguing a repudiation of these 
transactions, Holmes impliedly acknowledges the existence in 
the first place of Holmes' agreement; and, therefore, Holmes 
further impliedly acknowledges that Holmes is not entitled 
to a commission in the absense of such a repudiation. 
The simple and obvious response to this allegation 
is not only the express findings of the trial court to the 
contrary but, also, the fact that the sale did go through 
with the same sale price as stated in the option. DeGraff 
did not repudiate the contract nor refuse to complete the 
sale. 
The respondent agrees with Holmes' argument on page 
14 of Holmes' brief that a repudiation of a contract will be 
determined only when the showing is "positive and 
unequivocal." The trial court, obviously, did not find that 
such evidence existed but, rather, found that the 
transaction was completed as contemplated by the terms of 
the option. 
Holmes, further, argues on page lS of his brief 
that i\mer ican Development Company (who was not a party at 
any time to the agreements in issue involving a commission! 
somehow chose to discharge the contract between Holmes and 
DeGraff and to negotiate a new agreement. Holmes does not 
explain the process by which any such action by this 
third-party could purportedly operate to obviate a separate 
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agreement between Holmes and DeGraff. Moreover, Holmes' 
argument ignores the facts that ( 1) Holmes never entered 
into any subsequent agreement with DeGraff altering the 
terms of the option agreement relative to a commission and 
no documents purporting to do so were ever offered into 
evidence; (2) the final agreement with American Development 
Company makes no mention at all of a commission; and ( 3) 
Holmes' argument assumes facts contrary to the trial court's 
express findings. 
It is respectfully submitted that the only 
repudiation in the entire transaction was Holmes' attempted 
repudiation of his agreement entitling himself to no 
commission. 
ARGUMENT IV 
HOLMES' AGREEMENT SUPERSEDED ANY CONTRARY 
AGREEMENTS WITH THE BOARD OF REALTORS 
Holmes finally urges that, the option agreement 
purportedly being unenforceable, the rules, regulations and 
documents involved in the multiple listing service of the 
board of realtors mandate payment of a commission. Evidence 
indicates that Holmes assumed, despite the specific language 
Holmes inserted in the option, that documentation filed with 
the Board of Real tors governs in any regard ( Tr. 105, 106; 
Exhibit 30-Dl. The respondent does not agree that the Board 
-17-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of Realtors documentation is applicable in this case. 
Assuming, however, for the sake of argument, that it is 
applicable, Holmes, without citing any statutory or other 
authority for this position, presumably considers the Board 
of Real tors documents to constitute some type of "super 
contract" which will preclude any subsequent negotiation or 
agreement to the contrary by the brokers. 
The dealings and documents of the board of realtors 
normally contemplate agreements for commissions involving a 
sale by brokers of properties involving third parties. This 
case, however, involves a transaction directly between a 
buyer and seller of properties in which a commission 
normally is not involved. 
Holmes acknowledged in his testimony that he had 
some people in mind to whom he might sell the property a~. 
further, somehow considered that he was, in effect, getting 
an exclusive listing of the property through means of this 
option ( Tr. 108). The fact that he may have had someone in 
mind to whom he might sell the property, however, does not 
place this transaction in the same category in which a 
person is clearly acting as an agent for another party. No 
agency relationship was in existence; and Holmes simply 
negotiated the arrangements of the transactions as l 
party-in-interest to the sale and purchase. 
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Even less complimentary to Holmes' position is the 
fact that the evidence indicated that Holmes (ostensibly in 
good faith) agreed in writing that no commission would be 
payable while he, at the same time, secretly intended to 
seek a commission regardless of the express agreement 
(Exhibit 33-D). This Court, in a case cited by appellant, 
discussed principles of fair dealing which is applicable 
here: 
To be considered in that connection is 
the fact that it seems to us that openhanded 
and fair dealing would have required the 
defendant to state any claims it intended to 
assert. Contrariwise, it should not be 
permitted to remain silent and induce the 
other party into a settlement, and thereafter 
come forward with such a claim. To permit it 
to do so would run afoul of the 
well-established rule: that were paries engage 
in negotiations concerning a transaction, 
pursuant to which they enter into a written 
contract, it is presumed that all matters 
relating to the subject are merged in and 
constitute a complete integration of their 
agreement. National Surety Corporation v. 
Christiansen Brothers, Inc., 29 Utah 2d 460, 
463, 511 P.2d 731, 733 (1973). 
The respondent strongly urges that the Courts 
should not be placed in the position of rewarding Holmes' 
method of dealings, and the manner of his negotiation in 
this case, by overriding the clear language of the option, 
and the clear and unambiguous findings of fact by the trial 
court. 
-19-
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CONCLUSION 
The issues raised by the appellant involve issues 
of fact which were resolved in the respondent's favor. The 
fact that Holmes, subsequent to entering into his agreement, 
may have had regrets, or the fact that Holmes may now 
believe that he received less of a bargain or benefit than 
he otherwise might have, should not be of concern to the 
Courts. 
The respondent, therefore, respectfully requests 
that the Judgment of the trial court be affirmed. 
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